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TOWARDS A RULES-BASED ASEAN: THE PROTOCOL TO THE ASEAN CHARTER ON 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS 
 
Hao Duy Phan

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Under the ASEAN Charter,
1
 disputes arising from ASEAN economic agreements 
are resolved by the 2004 ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
(eDSMP).
2
 Disputes relating to specific ASEAN instruments shall be settled through the 
mechanisms and procedures provided by such instruments.
3
 Disputes that do not concern 
the interpretation or application of any ASEAN instruments may be resolved in 
accordance with the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC).
4
 Article 
25 of the ASEAN Charter, in particular, provides that appropriate mechanisms, including 
arbitration, shall be established for the settlement of disputes relating to the interpretation 
or application of the ASEAN Charter and other ASEAN instruments. 
To implement Article 25 of the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
signed the Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms (DSMP) 
on April 8, 2010.
5
 Two years later, they signed the Instrument to Incorporate the Rules 
for Reference of Non-Compliance to the ASEAN Summit in April 2012, marking the end 
                                           

 Hao Duy Phan (S.J.D.) is a Research Fellow at the Centre for International Law, National University 
of Singapore.  
1
  The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 and currently 
consists of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
and Vietnam. The Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations is a treaty establishing the legal 
and institutional framework for ASEAN. The ASEAN Charter entered into force on Dec. 15, 2008. See 
Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Nov. 20, 2007 [hereinafter ASEAN Charter].  
2
  Id. at art. 24(3). See also ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, Nov. 29, 
2008, available at http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-summit/item/asean-protocol-on-enhanced-dispute-
settlement-mechanism (last visited Dec. 2, 2012) [hereinafter eDSMP].  The eDSMP was signed in 
Vientiane on  November 29, 2004 by the ASEAN Economic Ministers and entered into force on the same 
day. The eDSMP was preceded by the Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism in 1996 and applies to 
disputes arising under the 1992 Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation as 
well as retroactively to earlier key economic agreements and to future ASEAN economic agreements. 
3
 See ASEAN Charter, supra note 1, at art. 24(1). 
4
 See id. at art. 24(2). The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Feb. 24, 1976, 1025 
U.N.T.S. 15, 316  is the first legally binding document in the region affirming that settlement of disputes by 
peaceful means is a “fundamental principle” that guides the relationship between all High Contracting 
Parties. Until the ASEAN Charter came into force, it had been the only regional mechanism for resolving 
disputes of political and security nature in Southeast Asia. The TAC dispute settlement mechanism is not 
only for Southeast Asia nations or ASEAN member states. To date, many non-ASEAN countries have 
acceded to the treaty, including China, the United States, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, India, Pakistan, 
Russia, France, Timor-Leste, Australia, and the European Union, among others. The TAC has so far 
remained the only regional settlement mechanism for disputes arising between a Southeast Asian state and 
an extra-regional country. 
5
 See ASEAN, Statement of the ASEAN Chair on the Signing of the Protocol to the ASEAN Charter 
on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, available at http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-summit/item/statement-
of-the-asean-chair-on-the-signing-of-the-protocol-to-the-asean-charter-on-dispute-settlement-mechanisms-
by-the-foreign-ministers-of-asean (last visited Dec. 2, 2012) [hereinafter Statement of the ASEAN Chair]. 
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of the process of drafting necessary annexes to the DSMP.
6
 The DSMP has not yet 
entered into force, pending ratifications by all ten ASEAN member states.
7
 So far only 
Vietnam has ratified the DSMP.
8
 ASEAN member states nevertheless are obligated to 
refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.
9
 In the words of 
the Chairman of ASEAN, the signing of the DSMP has indicated “the determination of 
ASEAN in transforming ASEAN into a rules-based organization and serve to facilitate 
the implementation of the Charter and ASEAN Community building.”10 
This paper focuses on the rules and procedures of the DSMP and its significance in 
further institutionalizing ASEAN into a rules-based regional organization.
11
 The next section 
of the paper traces the process that led to the signing of the DSMP. It argues that the 
conclusion of the DSMP represents a step forward for ASEAN in translating its rhetoric 
of a rules-based organization to reality. The third section offers a thorough description and 
detailed analysis of how ASEAN will resolve disputes via the DSMP. It investigates the 
DSMP’s scope of application, examines the process of dispute settlement that ASEAN 
government officials have agreed upon, and reviews all dispute settlement mechanisms 
provided for in the DSMP that remain pending on ratifications by individual ASEAN 
member states. 
The fourth section addresses the issue of unresolved disputes among ASEAN 
member states. It seeks to answer questions as to what constitutes an unresolved dispute, how 
unresolved disputes are addressed in the DSMP, and whether the reference of unresolved 
disputes to the ASEAN Summit may imply that disputes will be resolved through a political 
process at the expense of the rule of law. The fifth section focuses on the issue of 
enforcement and compliance with respect to the DSMP. Building on an analysis of ASEAN’s 
                                           
6
 See Chairman’s Statement of the 20th ASEAN Summit, Samdech Akka Moha Sena Padei Techo 
HUN SEN, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia (Apr. 4, 2012), available at 
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/2012%20Chairmans%20Statement%20of%20the%2020th%20ASEAN%20Sum
mit-pdf.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2012). 
7
 Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms art. 19(4), Apr. 8, 2010  
[hereinafter DSMP], available at 
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/2010%20Protocol%20to%20the%20ASEAN%20Charter%20on%20Dispute%2
0Settlement%20Mechanisms-pdf.pdf (last visited Apr. 15. 2013). 
8
 See Government of Vietnam, Về việc phê chuẩn Nghị định thư Hiến chương ASEAN về các cơ chế 
giải quyết tranh chấp [Report to the President on the Ratification of the Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on 
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms], Official Note 213/TTr-CP, Aug. 29, 2012, available at 
http://baodientu.chinhphu.vn/Uploaded_VGP/dothanhhoai/20120904/QD%20213.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 
2013). 
9
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
8 I.L.M. 679. Not all ASEAN member states are parties to the Convention but all of them have in fact 
applied different provisions in the Convention in their treaty relations with other countries. 
10
 See Statement of the ASEAN Chair, supra note 5; Instrument of Incorporation of the Rules for 
Reference of Non-compliance to the ASEAN Summit to the Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on Dispute 
Settlement Mechanisms, infra note 31. 
11
 A rules-based international organization, we believe, should be premised on and operate according 
to a highly developed set of rules and norms. These rules and norms should effectively structure the 
interaction among state members of that organization. There should be effective mechanisms to ensure 
adherence and compliance to rules and norms. More generally, as the LexisNexis Group explains, the most 
important application of rules-based/rule of law approach is “the principle that governmental authority is 
legitimately exercised only in accordance with written, publicly disclosed laws adopted and enforced in 
accordance with established procedural steps that are called due process.” LexisNexis, Rule of Law, 
http://www.lexisnexis.co.nz/en-nz/about-us/rule-of-law.page (last visited Dec. 2, 2012). 
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procedural mechanisms for dispute settlement in the previous parts of the paper, this section 
will evaluate the likelihood of enforcement and compliance with the final results of dispute 
settlement mechanisms set up in the DSMP. The paper’s final argument is that, whereas the 
DSMP does represent a step forward for ASEAN in the direction towards a rules-based 
organization, it contains inherent limitations that will constrain the development of highly 
effective mechanisms to resolve disputes among ASEAN member states. The goal of a 
rules-based ASEAN continues to require further institutional innovations, not least in the 
area of dispute settlement. 
II. FROM THE ASEAN CHARTER TO THE PROTOCOL ON DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
MECHANISMS 
ASEAN announced its intention to create a “legal and institutional framework” in 
the form of a Charter in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the 
ASEAN Charter in 2005.
12
 To implement the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, the Eminent 
Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter (EPG) was established to brainstorm “bold and 
visionary ideas”13 and recommend key elements of the ASEAN Charter that also included 
“effective conflict resolution mechanisms.”14 In the span of one year from December 
2005 to December 2006, the EPG had as many as eight meetings
15
 that resulted in a 
report submitted to the ASEAN Summit in December 2006. The Report recommended 
that “ASEAN shall put in place effective dispute settlement mechanisms which include 
mechanisms similar to those available under the 2004 Protocol.”16 It suggested that 
ASEAN dispute settlement mechanisms should include advisory and consultative 
procedure as well as binding adjudication.
17
 Compliance monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms should be established and ASEAN should have the power to take measures, 
including suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, to redress cases of 
serious breach of ASEAN’s objectives, major principles, and commitments to important 
agreements.
18
 ASEAN should have a more flexible decision-making mechanism. 
“Decision-making by consultation and consensus should be retained for all sensitive 
                                           
12
 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter (Dec. 12, 2005), available 
at http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-summit/item/kuala-lumpur-declaration-on-the-establishment-of-the-
asean-charter-kuala-lumpur-12-december-2005 (last visited Dec. 2, 2012). 
13
 Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter, para. 2, available at 
http://www.asean.org/archive/19247.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2012). 
14
 Terms of Reference of the Eminent Persons Group, para. 4.2(i), available at 
http://www.asean.org/archive/ACP-TOR.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2012). 
15
 The Eminent Persons Group also held two other meetings with members of the civil society, private 
business sector representatives, and academics. See Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN 
Charter, supra note 13. 
16
 Id. at para. 64 (emphasis added). Although the EPG Report did not elaborate on what it meant by 
“effective,” several elements in the EPG’s recommendations would be instructive in creating effective 
dispute settlement mechanisms under the ASEAN Charter. “The 2004 Protocol” is the eDSMP, which 
provides for decision-making on the basis of negative consensus rather than positive concensus.  See also 
id. at para. 42.   
17
 Id. at para. 64.  
18
 Id. at para. 6.  
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important decisions [but], if the consensus cannot be achieved, decisions may be taken 
through voting, subject to rules of procedure determined by the ASEAN Council.”19 
The EPG Report served as a basis for the High Level Task Force (HLTF) 
commissioned by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at the 39
th
 Meeting in Kuala Lumpur
20
 
to draft the ASEAN Charter, including Chapter VIII of the Charter on Settlement of 
Disputes.
21
 Within ten months from January to October 2007, the HLTF held a total of 14 
meetings, including one informal meeting, made regular reports to the ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers, and managed to complete drafting specific provisions of the ASEAN 
Charter.
22
 In November 2007, the ASEAN Charter was signed by leaders of ten ASEAN 
member states at their 13
th
 Summit in Singapore and it finally entered into force in 
December 2008, marking a major step forward in the evolution of the organization.
23
 
A close reading of the ASEAN Charter reveals that the EPG’s bold 
recommendations concerning sanction mechanisms against violators and decision-
making through voting are not reflected in the Charter. Nevertheless, other ideas of the 
EPG were incorporated in the ASEAN Charter that has served the Association in many 
ways: helping to accord ASEAN legal personality, articulating ASEAN’s objectives and 
principles, strengthening ASEAN’s structure, mandating the ASEAN Secretary-General 
to monitor the implementation of ASEAN decisions and instruments, establishing a 
human rights body, and laying the foundation for the development of dispute settlement 
mechanisms in all fields of cooperation.
24
 Article 25 of the ASEAN Charter, in particular, 
states that appropriate dispute settlement mechanisms, including arbitration, shall be 
established to address disputes relating to the interpretation or application of the ASEAN 
Charter and other ASEAN instruments. 
The reference to arbitration in Article 25 is of notable significance because the 
award of an arbitral tribunal is binding upon the parties to the dispute. When the Article 
was drafted, there was in fact a long internal debate within the HLTF on whether an ASEAN 
                                           
19
 Id. at para. 8.  
20
 ASEAN, Joint Communiqué of the 39th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), available at 
http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community/item/joint-communique-of-the-
39th-asean-ministerial-meeting-amm-kuala-lumpur-25-july-2006-3 (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).  
21
 While the EPG was composed of highly distinguished and well respected ASEAN citizens who did 
not serve in their governments at that time and would submit their report to the ASEAN Summit, the HLTF 
was composed of high-level government officials and would report the outcome of their work to the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers. The biographies of the members of the Eminent Persons Group are available at 
http://www.asean.org/archive/ACP-Bio-EPG.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2012). The biographies of High Level 
Task Force members are available at http://www.asean.org/archive/ACP-Bio-HLTF.pdf (last visited Dec. 
2, 2012). According to the HLTF TOR, which is available at http://www.asean.org/archive/ACP-TOR.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 2, 2012), the HLTF “shall draft the ASEAN Charter based on the directions given by the 
Leaders as reflected in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter and the 
Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter and in consideration of the recommendations 
made by the EPG and other relevant ASEAN documents.”  See id. 
22
 ASEAN, Activities of the High Level Task Force, available at http://www.asean.org/archive/HLTF-
Activities.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
23
 See ASEAN, ASEAN Charter Enters into Force Next Month, available at 
http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-charter/media-releases-on-the-asean-charter/item/asean-charter-enters-
into-force-next-month-bangkok-15-november-2008 (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
24
 See ASEAN, ASEAN Leaders Sign ASEAN Charter (Nov. 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.asean.org/news/item/media-release-asean-leaders-sign-asean-charter-singapore-20-november-
2007 (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
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court or arbitration should be referred to in Article 25. Some delegations were skeptical that 
ASEAN was not yet ready for such a formal mechanism. Others claimed such reference 
would be inconsistent with the ASEAN way of non-confrontation and informal, quiet 
diplomacy.
25
 Yet others suggested that if ASEAN would follow a rules-based direction, then 
formal and binding dispute settlement mechanisms must be established.
26
 The final language 
adopted in Article 25 represents a compromise in which the idea of an ASEAN court is not 
included but appropriate dispute settlement mechanisms would include arbitration. 
To implement Article 25 of the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
agreed in July 2008 to form a High Level Legal Experts’ Group on Follow-up to the 
ASEAN Charter (HLEG) to draft, among others, a legal instrument on ASEAN dispute 
settlement mechanisms. The HLEG negotiation process suggested that dispute resolution 
has never been an easy issue for ASEAN. In fact, whereas the EPG had eight meetings in 
one year to complete its Report on all major elements of the ASEAN Charter and the 
HLTF had 14 meetings in ten months to draft the ASEAN Charter, it took the HLEG as 
many as 19 meetings over 16 months to draft the DSMP. The HLEG’s mandate was 
supposed to end in July 2009 but was extended until the end of 2009 so that the draft 
DSMP could be finished.
27
 To be fair, the HLEG did not only draft the DSMP; it also 
worked on the Agreement on ASEAN’s Privileges and Immunities. It should be noted, 
however, that when the DSMP was signed in Hanoi in April 2010, the DSMP was not 
even completed. The DSMP with four annexes, namely the Rules of Good Offices 
(Annex 1), the Rules of Mediation (Annex 2), the Rules of Conciliation (Annex 3), and 
the Rules of Arbitration (Annex 4), was signed by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers with the 
understanding that two more rules would have to be added later for the DSMP to be 
complete, namely the Rules for Reference of Unresolved Disputes to the ASEAN 
Summit and the Rules for Reference of Non-compliance to the ASEAN Summit.
28
 
Immediately after the DSMP was signed, the ASEAN Senior Officials’ Meeting 
(SOM) decided to establish a working group called the ASEAN SOM Working Group on 
Drafting HLEG’s Remaining Legal Instruments under the ASEAN Charter (Working 
                                           
25
 The “ASEAN Way” is generally characterized by four elements: (1) respect for the internal affairs of 
other members; (2) non-confrontation and quiet diplomacy; (3) non-recourse to use or threat to use of 
force; and (4) decision-making through consensus, which is unique to ASEAN. See Hiro Katsumata, 
Reconstruction of Diplomatic Norms in Southeast Asia: The Case for Strict Adherence to the ‘ASEAN 
Way’, 25 CONTEMP. SOUTHEAST ASIA 104, 106-07 (2003).  See also Beverly Loke, The ‘ASEAN Way’: 
Towards Regional Order and Security Cooperation, 30 MELBOURNE J. POL. 8 (2005). According to Jurgen 
Haacke, ‘the ASEAN way’ is composed of six elements: sovereign equality, quiet diplomacy, non-recourse 
to use or threat to use of force, non-involvement in bilateral disputes, non-interference and quiet diplomacy. 
See Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: A Constructivist Assessment, 3 INT’L REL. 
OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC 57, 59 (2003). 
26
 See Walter Woon, Dispute Settlement in ASEAN (Oct. 17, 2011) (unpublished paper) (on file with 
the Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore), available at 
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/DISPUTE-SETTLEMENT-IN-ASEAN-KSIL-
ProfWalterWoon.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
27
 See ASEAN, ASEAN Annual Report 2009 – 2010, available at 
http://www.asean.org/resources/publications/asean-publications/item/annual-report-2009-2010 (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2013). 
28
 See Statement of the ASEAN Chair, supra note 5.  
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Group).
29
 Once the Working Group finalized the Rules for Reference of Unresolved 
Disputes to the ASEAN Summit, ASEAN Foreign Ministers signed an instrument to 
incorporate the Rules to the DSMP as Annex 5 in October 2010.
30
 Finally, the Rules for 
Reference of Non-compliance to the ASEAN Summit were added to the DSMP as Annex 
6 in April 2012.
31
 At the 20
th
 ASEAN Summit, the signing of the Instruments of 
Incorporation of the Rules for Reference of Non-compliance to the ASEAN Summit to 
the DSMP was touted as marking “the completion of the process of developing the legal 
instruments identified under the Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms . . .”32 The DSMP is now open for ratification by ASEAN member states. 
Article 19 (4) of the DSMP requires ratifications by all ten ASEAN member states before 
it can enter into effect.
33
 
The potential implications for ASEAN to have the DSMP should not be 
underestimated. The conclusion of the DSMP realizes the goal stated in the ASEAN 
Charter of creating dispute settlement mechanisms in all fields of ASEAN cooperation.
34
 
Once the DSMP enters into force, ASEAN will for the first time in its history have a 
settlement mechanism for disputes concerning its Charter, something other regional 
organizations have had for quite some time. The European Union, for example, has the 
Court of Justice of the European Union
35
 and the African Union has the African Court of 
Justice to resolve disputes relating to the interpretation and application of their 
constitutional documents.
36
 Although the DSMP does not create a permanent judicial 
body for ASEAN like courts of justice for other international and regional organizations, 
it does offer a venue for ASEAN member states to pursue in case they have disputes 
concerning the interpretation and application of the ASEAN Charter. 
                                           
29
 See id; see also ASEAN, Joint Communiqué of the 44th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (July 
19, 2011), http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statement-communiques/item/joint-communique-of-the-44th-
asean-foreign-ministers-meeting-bali-indonesia-19-july-2011 (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
30
 See ASEAN, Instrument of Incorporation of the Rules for Reference of Unresolved Disputes to the 
ASEAN Summit to the Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms (Oct. 27, 
2010), available at 
http://www.asean.org/images/archive/documents/Instrument%20of%20Incorporation%20of%20Rules%20f
or%20Reference%20of%20Unresolved%20Disputes.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
31
 See ASEAN, Instrument of Incorporation of the Rules for Reference of Non-compliance to the 
ASEAN Summit to the Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms (Apr. 2, 2012), 
available at http://www.asean.org/images/archive/documents/Instrument-
ASEAN%20Charter%20on%20Dispute%20Settlement%20Mechanism.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
32
 Sandech Aka Moha Sena Padei Techo HUN SEN, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia, 
Chair of ASEAN, Chairman’s Statement of the 20th ASEAN Summit on Drug Free ASEAN 2015 (Apr. 3, 
2012) (transcript available at CAMBODIA NEW VISION, http://cnv.org.kh/en/?p=548 (last visited Mar. 10, 
2013)). 
33
 See DSMP, supra note 7, at art. 19(4).  
34
 See ASEAN Charter, supra note 1, at art. 22(2).  
35
 As part of its mission, the Court shall interpret European Union law at the requests of national courts 
and tribunals.  See General Presentation, E.C.J. (CURIA), http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_6999/ (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2013).  
36
 As part of its mission, the Court shall interpret all provisions of the Charter. The African Court of 
Justice has been merged with the African Court of Human and People’s Right to become “The African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights.” The merging Protocol was adopted at the African Union Summit in 
2008.  See The African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, AFRICAN UNION, 
http://www.au.int/en/organs/cj (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).      
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With the DSMP, for the first time, ASEAN will have a mechanism of arbitration for 
political or security disputes. Prior to the DSMP, these types of disputes were considered 
either internal affairs among involved parties or too sensitive for ASEAN to address with a 
formal settlement mechanism. As a matter of fact, ASEAN has never had arbitration as a 
mode of dispute settlement mechanism before, except in the eDSMP where arbitration is only 
provided in cases of disputes concerning compensation and suspension of concessions.
37
 For 
a region where respect for sovereignty and non-interference principles have long dominated 
international discourse and state behavior, the presence of an arbitration mechanism for 
disputes concerning sensitive issues of political and security nature would represent a step 
forward for ASEAN. 
In sum, the conclusion of the DSMP demonstrates ASEAN commitment to 
peaceful resolution of disputes and reflects ASEAN’s efforts to translate its rhetoric of a 
rules-based organization to reality. It should be noted that the HLEG was established to 
draft the DSMP even before the ASEAN Charter came into force. Members of the HLEG 
and later the Working Group had working meetings on a monthly basis for three years 
from 2008 to 2011 under several ASEAN chairmanships to complete the DSMP. Drafting 
the DSMP was seen as an important item on the agenda of ASEAN and completing the 
DSMP was always a priority for ASEAN. The fact that many ASEAN member states 
have seriously entertained and committed to the very real possibility of having dispute 
settlement mechanisms for all fields of ASEAN cooperation is an important sign that their 
moving in the rules-based direction is not merely rhetoric. That lofty goal of a rules-based 
ASEAN notwithstanding, whether the mechanisms provided for in the DSMP can prove 
effective in resolving disputes among ASEAN member states requires a more careful 
examination. 
III. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE AND MECHANISMS UNDER THE DSMP 
A. Scope of Application 
The DSMP puts in place different mechanisms to help ASEAN Member States 
resolve their disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the ASEAN Charter. 
As said, this is the first time ASEAN has a settlement mechanism for disputes concerning 
its “constitutional” document. 
  The DSMP also applies to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of 
“other ASEAN instruments.” Article 25 of the ASEAN Charter provides that “where not 
otherwise specifically provided, appropriate dispute settlement mechanisms, including 
arbitration, shall be established for disputes which concern the interpretation or 
application of this Charter and other ASEAN instruments.”38 Yet, it is not clear what 
“other ASEAN instruments” implies. Reference to “ASEAN instruments” in a few other 
articles in the ASEAN Charter does not help clarify its meaning. Article 2(1) states that 
“ASEAN and its Member States reaffirm and adhere to the fundamental principles 
contained in the declarations, agreements, conventions, concords, treaties and other 
                                           
37
 See eDSMP, supra note 2, at art. 16(7)-(8). 
38
 ASEAN Charter, supra note 1, at art. 25 (emphasis added). 
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instruments of ASEAN.”39 Article 52(1) provides that “[a]ll treaties, conventions, 
agreements, concords, declarations, protocols and other ASEAN instruments which have 
been in effect before the entry into force of this Charter shall continue to be valid.”40 In 
Article 20(3), the term “instruments” is qualified into legal instruments that “[n]othing 
[...] shall affect the modes of decision-making as contained in the relevant ASEAN legal 
instruments.”41 
Three potential questions may arise with respect to the kinds of instruments that 
Article 25 refers to. First, does “other ASEAN instruments” in Article 25 of the ASEAN 
Charter refer to all ASEAN instruments, including political statements, or only legal 
instruments, i.e., ASEAN treaties? Second, do ASEAN instruments include agreements 
concluded between ASEAN and an external party? Finally, does an ASEAN instrument 
need to have entered into force or does it have to be ratified by all ASEAN member states 
before the DSMP may be invoked? It is worth noting that certain ASEAN instruments 
such as the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism have entered into force even 
though not all member states had ratified them.
42
 
Answers to these questions can be found in Article 1 and Article 2 of the DSMP. 
To be consistent with Article 25 of the ASEAN Charter, the DSMP retains the term 
ASEAN instruments but specifies that these instruments must be “concluded” by ASEAN 
member states “in written form, that [give] rise to their respective rights and obligations 
in accordance with international law.”43 Reading the definition of “ASEAN instrument” 
in the DSMP in line with the definition of “treaty” in the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, which provides that “‘treaty’ means an international agreement concluded 
between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a 
single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation,”44 one can reasonably conclude that in the DSMP, “ASEAN instruments” 
means ASEAN legal instruments or ASEAN treaties. 
By stating that an “ASEAN instrument” needs to be concluded by member states 
“as ASEAN Member States,” the DSMP excludes from its purview any agreements 
concluded between states in their individual capacity and not in the capacity of ASEAN 
Member States. In the same vein, the DSMP also excludes agreements concluded 
between ASEAN as an inter-governmental organization and its member states or a third 
external party such as the Agreement between Indonesia and ASEAN on Hosting and 
Granting Privileges and Immunities to the ASEAN Secretariat (Host Country Agreement 
– HCA).45 Under the Rules of Procedure for Conclusion of International Agreements by 
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ASEAN, documents such as the HCA are now called “international agreements by 
ASEAN.”46 Finally, that the term “concluded” rather than “signed” indicates that “other 
ASEAN instruments” would have to enter into force before dispute settlement 
mechanisms in the DSMP may be triggered. 
As stated in Article 2 of the DSMP, the Protocol shall apply to disputes 
concerning the interpretation or application of any “other ASEAN instruments unless 
specific means of settling such disputes have been provided for” (Article 2(1)(b)) or any 
“other ASEAN instruments that expressly provide this Protocol or part of this Protocol 
shall apply” (Article 2(1)(c)). In this regard, one might argue that Article 2(1)(c) seems 
unnecessary as the phrase “other ASEAN instruments unless specific means of settling 
such disputes have already been provided for” has, in effect, encompassed “other 
ASEAN instruments which expressly provide that this Protocol or part of this Protocol 
shall apply.” 
It is also interesting to note that the DSMP shall be interpreted “in accordance 
with the customary rules of treaty interpretation of public international law”47 instead of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Not many ASEAN instruments have a 
provision on the application of customary international law. The reason why the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties was not specifically referred to in the DSMP is 
probably because not all ASEAN member states are a party to the Convention. In fact, 
Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Vietnam are parties to the 
Convention whereas Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand are not.
48
 
In sum, the DSMP may be applied to disputes relating to all ASEAN legal 
instruments concluded by member states as ASEAN Member States, except for economic 
instruments or other instruments that already have their own separate dispute settlement 
mechanisms. A future ASEAN Convention on Human Rights, for example, would be 
subject to dispute settlement mechanisms under the DSMP if that Convention does not 
provide for its own specific dispute settlement mechanisms. In case there is an objection 
to the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal over a dispute, Rule 16 of Annex 4 (Rules of 
Arbitration) of the Protocol provides that the arbitral tribunal will determine the questions 
as to its own jurisdiction (competence sur la competence).
49
 
B. Dispute Settlement Procedure  
In terms of procedure under the DSMP, when a dispute arises, the complaining 
party may make a consultation request to the responding party. The responding party has 
30 days to reply to this request and must enter into consultation “with a view to reaching a 
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mutually agreed solution” within 60 days from the date of receiving the request.50 
Obligation to consult or exchange views is common in international treaties; for instance, 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
51
 or the Understanding 
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO).
52
 Consultation gives involved parties a chance to try to 
resolve their dispute in a manner perceived as less formal and confrontational. 
Consultation is also very much consistent with ASEAN’s traditional practice.53 
Furthermore, a requirement for consultation is also in line with Article 22(1) of the 
ASEAN Charter.
54
 
When the HLTF drafted Article 22(1) of the Charter, there was a proposal to 
break with the tradition by providing ASEAN member states the right to use legal means 
to resolve the dispute from the beginning. Other members, however, had reservations 
about the prospect that too much law would be involved in the initial stage of the dispute 
settlement process.
55
 In the end, it was concluded that, as a general principle, parties to 
the dispute should hold direct dialogue, consultation and negotiation first before 
employing any legally binding dispute settlement mechanism. Finally, as the procedure 
stipulates, within 30 days after the consultation request is made, if the responding party 
fails to respond or if consultation does not help resolve the dispute within 90 days from the 
date of receipt of the consultation request, the complaining party may request the 
establishment of an arbitral tribunal.
56
 As the award of an arbitral tribunal is binding and 
final,
57
 the fact that one party may go directly to arbitration after only a brief period of 
consultation is indeed a major change for ASEAN in terms of dispute settlement. For 
comparison, in the case of the eDSMP, if consultation fails, the matter has to go through 
the Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM) first, then to a dispute settlement panel, 
and after that to an appellate body should there be an appeal before recommendations and 
findings become final.
58
 
Once the arbitration request is made, the responding party has 15 days to positively 
respond to the complaining party; otherwise the complaining party may refer the dispute to 
the ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC).
59
 The ACC then has 45 days to make a decision 
in which it may “direct” the parties to the dispute to use good offices, mediation, 
conciliation or arbitration to have their dispute settled.
60
 During the whole process, the 
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parties to a dispute may also at any time agree to go through good offices, mediation or 
conciliation to resolve their disagreements.
61
 
The fact that the DSMP chooses to use the term “direct” instead of other possible 
terms like “suggest,” “propose,” or “recommend” is actually worth noting. “Direct” often 
carries a stronger force than either “suggest,” “propose,” or “recommend.” When parties 
to the dispute receive a direction from the ACC, they are expected to comply with the 
ACC decision even if that decision includes settlement through an arbitral tribunal. In 
fact, during the negotiation of the DSMP, this issue was the subject of a long debate 
within the HLEG. One argument was that ASEAN might not be ready for arbitration 
upon agreement between the concerned parties, let alone arbitration upon the direction of 
the ACC. There were also concerns that this provision may not be in accordance with the 
principle of non-interference that ASEAN has long upheld. One may argue, however, that 
compliance to the principle of non-interference is still maintained because the ACC – 
composed of all ASEAN member states, including the concerned parties – makes its 
decisions on a consensus basis.
62
 This basically guarantees that, if one of the concerned 
parties does not agree, the ACC cannot “direct” them to resort to arbitration to have their 
dispute resolved. 
C. Means of Dispute Settlements 
While arbitration is a formal and binding form of dispute resolution, good offices, 
mediation or conciliation are voluntary mechanisms that do not always result in a definite 
solution of the dispute. They are, after all, not intended to produce binding conclusions 
but rather to assist the parties in reaching a mutually agreed upon resolution. 
When the ACC directs that the dispute be resolved by good offices, it shall 
request the ASEAN Chairman or the ASEAN Secretary-General acting in an ex-officio 
capacity, or a suitable person to provide good offices.
63
 In their efforts to resolve the dispute, 
the concerned parties may also take the initiative to request the ASEAN Chairman or the 
ASEAN Secretary-General provide good offices, conciliation or mediation.
64
 They may also 
choose mediators, conciliators, or arbitrators from the list drawn up and maintained by 
the ASEAN Secretary-General.
65
 The effectiveness of the ASEAN Chair in this role, 
however, would probably depend on various factors, including the policy of the 
government that holds the ASEAN Chairmanship and even personal preferences of the 
head of state or the foreign minister of that government.
66
 For the ASEAN Secretary-
General, Article 4(3) of the eDSMP gives him a more active role where the Secretary-
General “may offer” to provide good offices, conciliation or mediation with a view to 
assisting the parties to settle their dispute. There were certain opinions within the HLTF and 
the HLEG in favor of empowering the ASEAN Secretary-General or the ASEAN Chairman 
to proactively offer good offices, conciliation or mediation without having to be requested in 
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the first place. Yet, concerns remained that a very active Secretary-General might be too 
ready to intervene.
67
 It was ultimately decided that it would be better to let the concerned 
parties make the request rather than allow outside actors to actively attempt to get involved.
68
 
According to the DSMP, the person providing good offices shall assist the parties 
in resolving the dispute by communicating directly with them in an independent, neutral 
and impartial manner.
69
 Parties to the dispute shall render the person providing good 
offices all necessary assistance to enable this person to carry out his or her 
responsibilities.
70
 A mediator shall have a quite similar role. He or she shall help to 
facilitate communication and negotiation between the parties with a view to resolving the 
dispute.
71
 He or she may invite the parties to the dispute to meet with him or her or may 
communicate with the parties together or separately, orally or in writing.
72
 
Compared with the person providing good offices or the mediator, a conciliator 
has a more active role to play. He or she may, at any stage of the conciliation 
proceedings, make proposals for a settlement of the dispute.
73
 Parties to the dispute have 
the obligation to cooperate in good faith with the conciliator. They shall endeavour to 
comply with requests by the conciliator to submit written materials, provide evidence and 
attend meetings.
74
 A conciliator may formulate and submit the terms of a possible 
settlement to the parties for their observations. A conciliator may also draft or assist the 
parties in drafting the settlement agreement.
75
 
Good offices, mediation or conciliation shall end if one or both parties or the 
person providing good offices, the mediator or the conciliator inform the ACC or each 
other that good offices, mediation or conciliation should be terminated or are no longer 
necessary or justified. Good offices, mediation or conciliation shall also cease on the date 
the parties inform the ACC that the dispute has been resolved or on the date a settlement 
agreement is signed.
76
 Where the parties reach a settlement of the dispute, they shall 
negotiate and sign an agreement. By signing the agreement, they put an end to the dispute 
and are bound by the agreement.
77
   
Under the DSMP, an arbitral tribunal is composed of three arbitrators.
78
 Each 
party to the dispute shall appoint one arbitrator. If one party fails to do so, the other party 
shall request the ASEAN Secretary-General to appoint the second arbitrator.
79
 The 
ASEAN Secretary-General shall, within fifteen (15) days from the date of receiving the 
request and in consultation with the party that has failed to appoint an arbitrator, appoint 
the second arbitrator, preferably from the list of individuals who may serve as 
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arbitrators.
80
 This list is drawn up and maintained by the Secretary-General of ASEAN 
who shall keep the Member States updated of any change to the list. Every member state 
shall be entitled to make ten nominations to that list.
81
 
The third arbitrator shall be appointed upon agreement by the parties.
82
 If the 
parties fail to do so, any party may request the ACC Chair to appoint the third arbitrator 
who shall be the chair of the arbitral tribunal.
83
 Here again, the ACC Chair cannot 
proactively offer to appoint the third arbitrator but has to be invited to do so. An active ACC 
Chair like Indonesia may informally offer to help, but not all ASEAN member states 
would do the same if they assume the ASEAN Chairmanship.
84
 Thus, to enhance the role of 
the ACC in expediting the arbitration process, ASEAN needs to create a sustainable 
mechanism and cannot count on being fortunate enough to have an active chair. 
It is also interesting to note, however, that while the ASEAN Secretary-General 
may also appoint the second arbitrator, he or she does not have the authority to appoint 
the third one. This restriction stems from the reluctance of ASEAN member states to give 
too much power to the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General can make a 
recommendation to the ACC Chair on the appointment of the third arbitrator, but before 
the recommendation is made, he or she must consult with the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives to ASEAN (CPR).
85
 Whether it is the CPR or the ACC, the decision shall 
be made on the basis of consensus. Even if the ACC Chair can appoint the third arbitrator 
and is actually obliged to appoint the third arbitrator within 15 days from the date of 
receipt of a request,
86
 it is likely that he will consult with his colleagues from other 
ASEAN member states, in particular the concerned states, before making any decision. In 
making his appointment, the ACC Chair shall appoint a national of an ASEAN Member 
State, who shall be on the list of arbitrators unless he concludes that exceptional 
circumstances require otherwise.
87
 If the ACC Chair is a national of one of the parties to 
the dispute, the appointment of the third arbitrator shall be made by the next ACC Chair 
who is not a national of one of the parties to the dispute.
88
 
As required by the DSMP, arbitrators shall possess expertise or experience in law 
and in the matters covered by the ASEAN Charter or the relevant ASEAN instrument.
89
 
They are chosen on the basis of objectivity and reliability.
90
 They are neither affiliated 
with nor take instructions from any parties to the dispute. The Chair of the arbitral 
tribunal shall not be a national of the parties and shall preferably be a national of an 
                                           
80
 Id.  
81
 Id. at annex 4, r. 5(1).  
82
 Id. at annex 4, r. 1(4)(a).  
83
 Id. at annex 4, r. 1(4)(b) & (c).  
84
 See International Crisis Group, Waging Peace: ASEAN and the Thai-Cambodian Border Conflict, 
Asia Report No. 215 (2011), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-
asia/cambodia/215-waging-peace-asean-and-the-thai-cambodian-border-conflict.aspx (last visited Dec. 2, 
2012). 
85
 See eDSMP, supra note 2, at annex 4, r. 1(4)(c).  
86
 DSMP, supra note 7, at annex 4, r. 1(4)(c). 
87
 Id. at annex 4, r. 1(4)(d). 
88
 eDSMP, supra note 2, at annex 4, r. 1(4)(e).  
89
 Id. at art. 11(2).  
90
 Id.  
 267 
 
ASEAN Member State.
91
 Parties to the dispute may challenge an arbitrator if 
circumstances indicate justifiable doubts as to his or her impartiality or independence.
92
 
After being established, an arbitral tribunal shall fix the timetable for the arbitral 
proceedings.
93
 Each party shall have an opportunity to submit to the tribunal in writing 
the facts of its case as well as its arguments and anticipated counter-arguments. Any 
timetable the tribunal sets shall include deadlines for submissions by the parties and shall 
provide for at least one hearing for the parties to present their case to the tribunal.
94
 The 
tribunal shall examine the facts of the case and decide the case in light of relevant 
provisions in the ASEAN Charter and other ASEAN instruments and shall provide 
reasons for its ruling.
95
 It may also apply relevant rules of public international law or 
decide a case ex aequo et bono if so agreed by the parties.
96
 Decisions of the arbitral 
tribunal shall be reached by a majority vote of its arbitrators.
97
 Where there is no 
majority, the Chair of the tribunal shall have a casting vote.
98
 
With regard to the timeframe provided for in the dispute settlement process, one 
may notice that the time periods provided for in the DSMP are generally longer than ones 
provided for in the eDSMP. For instance, the eDSMP – not unlike the Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) – allows the responding state ten days to respond and 30 days to 
enter into consultation after receiving a consultation request. In the DSMP, however, the 
responding party has 30 days to reply to such a request and must enter into consultation 
within 60 days. This difference may be explained by the fact that the two Protocols deal 
with two different sets of dispute. The eDSMP deals with economic disputes whereas the 
DSMP aims to address those arising from divergent interpretation and application of the 
ASEAN Charter and other ASEAN instruments. The latter kind of disputes is usually 
political, social and cultural in nature and often considered more complicated and 
sensitive within ASEAN. 
It is also interesting to note that the dispute settlement procedure is quite 
transparent to other ASEAN member states that are not a party to the dispute. Although 
detailed matters relating to the proceedings are kept confidential, all other ASEAN 
member states receive notifications on all major steps of the process. Even at the initial 
stage of consultation when it may involve information that the concerned parties might 
want to keep confidential, Article 5 still requires parties to a dispute to notify all other 
member states of the request for consultation, as well as its resulting outcome. 
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IV. REFERENCE OF UNRESOLVED DISPUTES TO THE ASEAN SUMMIT 
A. Referring Unresolved Disputes to the ASEAN Summit 
Unlike in many other international and regional institutions where disputes of a 
political or security nature remain untouched unless all parties to the disputes agree to 
address them, Article 26 of the ASEAN Charter provides that, if concerned parties fail to 
resolve the dispute after the application of all relevant dispute settlement mechanisms 
such as TAC, eDSMP or DSMP, the dispute shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit for 
its decision. During the drafting process of the DSMP there was a debate on whether or 
not to address Article 26 of the ASEAN Charter in the DSMP. Some countries 
maintained that the DSMP should only focus on different dispute mechanisms, including 
good offices (Annex 1), mediation (Annex 2), conciliation (Annex 3) and arbitration 
(Annex 4). Other countries insisted that the DSMP needed to deal with the issue of 
reference of unresolved dispute to the ASEAN Summit; otherwise it would be difficult 
for them to sign the DSMP as it was. They argued that the idea behind Article 26 of the 
ASEAN Charter, as well as the entire Chapter VIII of the ASEAN Charter, was that all 
ASEAN disputes shall eventually be resolved and the issue of unresolved dispute needed 
to be addressed if ASEAN wanted to build a strong community in a rules-based direction. 
In the end, by way of a compromise, all member states agreed to sign the DSMP with 
only the above four annexes but the then ASEAN Chair – Vietnam – had to issue a 
Statement, saying that two more rules would be annexed for the DSMP to be completed, 
including the Rules for Reference of Unresolved Disputes to the ASEAN Summit and the 
Rules for Reference of Noncompliance to the ASEAN Summit.
 99
 
According to the Rules for Reference of Unresolved Disputes, before an 
unresolved dispute can reach the ASEAN Summit, it has to go through the ACC.
100
 The 
ACC would give the parties another chance to resolve their dispute without having to go 
to the ASEAN Summit. This requirement is justified by the fact that the ACC is entrusted 
by the ASEAN Charter with the preparation for the meetings of the ASEAN Summit.
101
 
However, since it is the right of Member States to refer unresolved disputes to the 
ASEAN Summit, the role of the ACC at this stage does not necessarily create another 
layer that might prevent the unresolved disputes from reaching the ASEAN Summit. The 
ACC cannot “direct” but can only “consider suggesting, recommending or providing 
assistance, as appropriate, to the Parties to the dispute to resolve the dispute through some 
other dispute settlement mechanisms provided for under this Protocol.”102 In any case, it 
is far from easy for the ACC to propose any specific suggestions or recommendations 
given the rule of making decisions on a consensus basis. 
Reference of an unresolved dispute to the ASEAN Summit shall be accompanied 
by memoranda or submissions prepared by the parties to the dispute and a report of the 
ACC that contains the dispute summary, actions taken by the concerned parties, actions 
taken by the ACC to resolve the dispute, and the ACC’s recommendations on how the 
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dispute may be resolved.
103
 It is interesting to note that at this stage, the ACC may 
recommend that a panel of experts be established to advise the ASEAN Summit on the 
resolution of the dispute.
104
 In reality, however, this provision can be difficult to 
implement as the ACC is required to achieve a consensus, i.e. all parties to the dispute 
agree to make any specific recommendations such as establishing an expert panel to 
resolve the dispute. 
During the reference process, parties to the dispute may jointly withdraw the 
reference of their unresolved dispute to the ASEAN Summit. In addition, the right to 
withdraw the reference is also applicable to the case of unilateral withdrawal by the party 
that has notified the ACC of the unresolved dispute. It should be noted that a reference to 
the ASEAN Summit could be withdrawn only on the basis that a dispute has already been 
resolved or the concerned parties agree that dispute will be resolved in another way. 
Otherwise, withdrawal of a reference of a dispute to the ASEAN Summit while the 
dispute remains unresolved is not allowed. 
B.  The Significance of Referring Unresolved Disputes to the ASEAN Summit 
An argument can be made that, in the current context of ASEAN, too many 
disputes will remain “unresolved” to be referred to the ASEAN Summit.105 There is also 
concern that if countries are allowed under Article 26 and Annex 5 of the DSMP to bring 
unresolved disputes to the ASEAN Summit, then they will bypass the legally provided 
dispute settlement mechanisms and go directly to the ASEAN Summit in search for a 
resolution. A tendency might result to have disputes resolved through a political solution 
at the expense of the rule of law. These legitimate cautions notwithstanding, they may not 
be as worrisome as it seems for several reasons.  
First, not all countries or parties to a dispute wish to refer their dispute to the 
ASEAN Summit or have their dispute regionalized. In the Preah Vihear dispute between 
Thailand and Cambodia,
106
 for instance, Thailand preferred to settle the dispute between 
just the two direct parties while Cambodia sought the involvement of the international 
community, i.e., the United Nations Security Council, the International Court of Justice 
and ASEAN.
107
 After years of inactivity, ASEAN, under the Indonesian Chairmanship, 
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was able to host an urgent meeting on the situation in February 2011. This meeting was 
organized at the ASEAN ministerial level, however, rather than at the Summit level.
108
 In 
this regard, the mere possibility of reference would play a certain role in creating more 
pressures for involved member states to resolve the dispute among themselves without 
one party having to refer the matter to the ASEAN Summit for the consideration of all 
other member states. 
Second, in order for a dispute to boil up to the ASEAN Summit, it has to be 
deemed “unresolved.” A dispute is considered unresolved only after it has exhausted all 
procedures and mechanisms provided for in the DSMP and remains unresolved. 
Specifically, disputes are considered unresolved after it has gone through multiple stages. 
First of all, consultation must fail to produce any specific results or be impossible to 
conduct. Then either the responding party rejects a request for the establishment of an 
arbitral tribunal or all concerned parties fail to agree on the establishment of an arbitral 
tribunal or using good offices, mediation, or conciliation to resolve the dispute. 
Furthermore, the ACC has to prove unable to reach a decision on how to direct the parties 
to resolve a dispute
109
 or the parties must fail to carry out the ACC direction.
110
 Disputes 
are considered unresolved only after the parties have carried out the ACC direction but 
the dispute cannot be settled
111
 or the parties mutually decide they are unable to resolve 
the dispute through the application of dispute settlement mechanisms under the DMSP 
upon which they have agreed.
112
 In this case, there is a possibility that parties to the 
dispute cannot come to an agreement that they are unable to resolve their dispute and, 
thus, the unresolved dispute cannot be referred to the ASEAN Summit. In short, if a 
country wants to refer the dispute to the ASEAN Summit, it first has to seek consultation; 
then it has to try good offices, mediation, or arbitration and go to the ACC to look for 
direction. Only after these mechanisms fail can it refer the unresolved dispute to the 
ASEAN Summit. 
Finally, the ASEAN Summit will not play the role of an “ASEAN Supreme 
Court” to resolve disputes among its members. It is unlikely that a particular leader of an 
ASEAN country would let eight or nine other leaders resolve a dispute it has with another 
regional country. It is worth remembering that the ASEAN Summit is a policy-making 
body
113
 that comprises all ASEAN member states, including parties to a dispute, and 
makes decisions on a consensus basis. Thus, the course of action the ASEAN Summit 
would most likely take in the case of an unresolved dispute is simply to express their 
concerns and then to recommend, urge or call upon the concerned parties to resolve the 
dispute by other peaceful means. 
In short, the DSMP – an implementing instrument of the ASEAN Charter – does 
not produce any pathbreaking institutional innovation to address all unresolved disputes 
among members of the Association. It simply specifies the procedures of reference for 
unresolved disputes to the ASEAN Summit as already provided in Article 26 of the 
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ASEAN Charter. The fact that any party has the right to refer an unresolved dispute to the 
ASEAN Summit for the latter’s decisions114 is still quite significant as it may create 
pressures for concerned parties to work together and try to resolve disputes among them 
and thereby avoid having the matter considered by all other member states and facing the 
“naming and shaming” that may follow. This is probably the most important effect the 
procedure of reference has in terms of facilitating dispute settlement in accordance with 
the DSMP. 
V. ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE  
In the best-case scenario, the final result of dispute settlement by good offices, 
mediation or conciliation is a settlement agreement among the parties concerned and the 
final result of dispute settlement by arbitration is an arbitral award. Both arbitral awards 
and settlement agreements are binding. In other words, parties to the dispute are obliged 
to “comply with the arbitral awards and settlement agreements resulting from good 
offices, mediation and conciliation.”115 
The ASEAN Secretary-General is tasked with the role of monitoring compliance 
with the final results of these dispute settlement mechanisms.
116
 In order for the ASEAN 
Secretary-General to perform this duty, he or she shall be notified whenever a mutually 
agreed upon settlement is reached.
117
 If the dispute is resolved by an arbitral award or a 
settlement agreement, parties to the dispute are required to provide the Secretary-General 
with a written status report stating the extent of its compliance with the arbitral award or 
settlement agreement.
118
 The Secretary-General certainly cannot, and does not, work 
alone but has the assistance of the ASEAN Secretariat and other designated bodies of 
ASEAN.
119
 He or she has to prepare and submit to the ASEAN Summit a report on 
compliance to dispute settlements for the latter’s consideration. Since the DSMP has not 
entered into force and no dispute has been resolved under the DSMP, the Secretary-
General has not produced any reports in this regard, and it is not clear what a future 
report would look like. Neither is it clear how often the Secretary-General has to submit 
her reports and, more importantly, what the ASEAN Summit would do with them. It 
remains unclear as well whether the reports can be made public and whether the 
Secretary-General has to submit a different report for each case or combine all cases in 
one report about compliance in general. These issues need to be clarified if ASEAN 
continues to refine and develop the monitoring scheme of its dispute settlement 
mechanisms. 
What will happen if a party fails to comply with an arbitral award or a settlement 
agreement? The DSMP provides that cases of non-compliance with an arbitral award or a 
settlement agreement achieved through good offices, mediation or conciliation may be 
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referred to the ASEAN Summit for its consideration and decision.
120
 This reference 
should be done by the member states aggrieved by non-compliance, not by the ASEAN 
Secretary-General. Before going to the ASEAN Summit, however, the matter has to be 
considered by the ACC. In this regard, the ACC potentially has an active role to play in 
helping concerned parties to find a way to comply with arbitral awards or settlement 
agreements before having the instance of non-compliance referred to the ASEAN 
Summit. Specifically, the ACC shall attempt to conduct consultations among concerned 
parties with a view to facilitating compliance.
121
 The ACC may also authorize its Chair or 
any other person to facilitate consultations and report their outcomes.
122
 If the party 
aggrieved by non-compliance is satisfied with the consultation outcome, it may decide to 
withdraw the reference to the ASEAN Summit.
123
 
In referring instances of non-compliance to the ASEAN Summit, the ACC shall 
submit to the ASEAN Summit a report which contains information provided by the 
relevant parties on actions taken to ensure compliance with the arbitral award or 
settlement agreement in question, information on actions taken by ACC to facilitate 
consultation, and reference to the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Article 
27(1) of the ASEAN Charter. The ACC report submitted to the ASEAN Summit may 
also include the ACC’s recommendations on any measures to ensure compliance.124 
Reference of non-compliance to the ASEAN Summit is an important attempt by 
ASEAN to promote compliance with decisions of the DSMP. Not all international or 
regional dispute settlement mechanisms provide for a reference to the highest political 
body composed of heads of states or governments in an instance where non-compliance 
is recorded. The mere reference is itself helpful when it comes to the issue of 
enforcement as it may have a “naming and shaming” effect, which may contribute to 
creating pressure for states to comply with arbitral awards or settlement agreements. In 
should be noted, however, that since the role of the ASEAN Summit is inherently limited 
by the consensus-based decision-making process, ultimately it will not be able take any 
strong actions against the non-compliant state. The EPG, in fact, was aware of this 
limitation and, in an attempt to address it, proposed that serious violations of ASEAN 
commitments should incur consequences, including suspension of the rights and 
privileges of membership. This bold recommendation, unfortunately, was not adopted in 
the ASEAN Charter. As a result, in the final analysis there is not much that the ASEAN 
Summit can do except to issue a statement encouraging the concerned parties to comply 
with the decision and further update the ASEAN Summit on the compliance matter. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The DSMP represents a step forward for ASEAN in the direction towards a rules-
based organization. It helps realize the ASEAN Charter’s goal of having dispute 
settlement mechanisms available in all fields of ASEAN cooperation and demonstrates 
that ASEAN’s commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes is not merely rhetoric. The 
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existence of an arbitration mechanism, the authority of the ACC to direct parties to 
resolve their disputes, and the possibility that unresolved disputes and non-compliance 
can be referred to the ASEAN Summit are all noteworthy. In short, the DSMP, if fully 
ratified by all ten ASEAN member states, holds hopes for solving disputes in the region 
by international law and regional mechanisms. Unfortunately, a more careful examination 
of the institutional design of the DSMP suggests that, for several reasons, such hopes are 
not very likely to be met with practical effectiveness. 
First, unlike the eDSMP, the DSMP chooses positive consensus over negative 
consensus in its modus operandi. The traditional way of making decisions on a consensus 
basis means that it is not easy for the dispute settlement mechanisms under the DSMP to 
be invoked. In the early 1990s, for example, Malaysia blocked the use of the TAC dispute 
settlement mechanism when Indonesia sought to refer the Ligitan/Sipadan territorial 
dispute to the Chairperson of the High Council of the TAC.
125
 Similarly, in 2010, 
Cambodia invoked Article 23 of the ASEAN Charter to request Vietnam – then the 
ASEAN Chairman – to mediate its dispute with Thailand over the Preah Vihear. 
Mediation did not follow because Thailand declined, insisting that the bilateral process 
should continue to proceed.
126
 Although these disputes were not concerning the 
interpretation or application of a particular ASEAN instrument, the instances indicate that 
consensus has in fact constrained the role of ASEAN as a venue for resolving disputes 
involving its member states. 
Article 9 of the DSMP seems to suggest that there are two scenarios in which a 
dispute may be brought to arbitration or another means of dispute settlement such as good 
offices, mediation or conciliation: the first one arising from mutual consent of concerned 
parties and the second one resulting from the ACC’s direction.127 In reality, there is only 
one scenario for a dispute to be brought to arbitration, i.e. where the consent of all 
concerned parties is forthcoming. The consensus principle that operates in the arbitration 
process actually relies on a somewhat circular logic. An unresolved dispute is referred to 
the ACC because the responding state does not accept arbitration. However there is not 
much the ACC can do when the responding state does not accept arbitration because the 
ACC proceeds on a consensus basis and it cannot reach a consensus without the nod of 
the responding state. 
The consensus basis of the decision-making process within ASEAN not only 
constrains the operation of the ACC in particular but also affects the effectiveness of the 
entire Protocol. Even though consensus is not uniformity, the final results of any 
negotiations must reflect the basic viewpoints and sensitivities of all parties.
128
 By 
implications, ASEAN decisions could not be adopted if even one single country 
consistently rejects it, which is likely to happen in case of disputes involving important 
national interests of a member state. Of particular relevance to the dispute settlement 
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procedure under the Protocol, the consensus requirement makes the ASEAN Summit 
unlikely to come up with a decision on how to address an unresolved dispute or an 
instance of non-compliance. Consensus, in effect, causes immense difficulties for 
ASEAN to play the role of an independent, neutral and effective institution that 
disputants usually look for if they want their dispute with another member state to be 
resolved by a third party. This explains why countries in the region have rarely chosen 
ASEAN to help resolve their disputes but would rather go to a judicial body such as the 
International Court of Justice when they are ready and determined to seek a definitive 
resolution to their dispute.
129
 
Second, although the ASEAN Secretary-General is assigned the role of 
monitoring the compliance of dispute parties with the arbitral awards and settlement 
agreements resulting from good offices, mediation and conciliation, the Secretary-
General is not empowered to refer specific cases of non-compliance to the ASEAN 
Summit or initiate any actions to ensure compliance. It is not clear in the DSMP how the 
Secretary-General will conduct his or her monitoring mandates. The only mandate the 
Secretary-General has is derived from the provisions that require concerned parties to 
notify him or her of the outcome of the dispute settlement and send him or her a status 
report.
130
 Yet, those essentially involve self-reports by the state parties regarding their 
compliance with the arbitral award or settlement agreement, not an objective report on 
the compliance or lack thereof by other parties to the dispute. 
Given the limited mandate and power, one may wonder how the Secretary-
General shall determine the basis and monitoring indicators on which to verify and 
evaluate state compliance. One may also question whether the Secretary-General has the 
authority to request concerned parties to provide further clarifications on measures that 
they have taken to ensure compliance. Even if the Secretary-General has the authority to 
do so, it is not clear whether concerned parties will be obligated to respond to the 
Secretary-General’s request. Nor is it obvious if the Secretary-General will submit one 
annual report to the ASEAN Summit or whether she may be able to bring up instances of 
failure to comply and refer to the ASEAN Summit any time she would like to. From the 
practice of ASEAN, it is likely that the report of the Secretary-General would be simply a 
compilation of status reports submitted by concerned parties and, if this is the case, then 
the monitoring role of the Secretary-General is essentially administrative. Questions may 
arise as to what the ASEAN Summit – a policy-making body that makes decision on a 
consensus basis – will do with the Secretary-General’s reports. Concerns may also be 
raised on whether the ASEAN Secretariat is provided with full capacity to assist the 
Secretary-General in her monitoring job. 
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Third, the DSMP does not expressly confer upon any bodies the right to undertake 
a specific act against non-compliant state parties. The EPG did recommend that ASEAN 
should have the power to take measures, including suspending the rights and privileges of 
membership, to redress cases of serious breach of ASEAN’s objectives, major principles, 
and commitments to important agreements.
131
 This recommendation, however, was not 
reflected either in the ASEAN Charter or in the DSMP. This potential shortcoming 
notwithstanding, one has to admit that this is the reality of ASEAN as well as many other 
institutions. Given a lack of political will and profound reluctance on the part of many 
governments to accept an international institution with a strong enforcement mechanism, 
enforcement under many treaties or institutions mostly takes the form of a voluntary 
system. Consequently, these institutions can hardly impose any type of substantial 
sanctions when countries fail to comply with their obligations. As Ian Brownlie observes, 
in general international law, the settlement of disputes by formal and legal procedures 
rests on the consent of concerned parties.
132
  In this regard, the DSMP does not prove to 
be an exception, especially in a region where sovereignty remains the primary concern in 
the mind of leaders of the Member States. 
Given these structural constraints, if ASEAN genuinely wants to fulfill its goal of 
establishing a political and security community, taking responsibility for its own peace 
and security, each of its member states has to invest more political will in ASEAN 
collective action. It needs to change its hitherto inflexible way of framing an issue as a 
domestic affair. A dispute between two member states should be, at the beginning, 
considered a regional issue instead of an internal affair. If ASEAN really “desires” to 
have “practical, efficient and credible mechanisms in place to resolve disputes in an 
effective and timely manner,”133 it cannot just rely on consensus, which is usually 
difficult, and many times virtually impossible, to achieve in case of disputes involving 
important interests of a member state. Moreover, the spirit of the ASEAN Charter and the 
DSMP is that disputes between ASEAN member states on ASEAN instruments should be 
resolved in a timely manner. Consensus, even if it is achievable, usually requires a 
lengthy process of negotiation and compromise to build up and, thus, will not help to 
resolve disputes in timely manner. Meanwhile, certain circumstances and escalating 
disputes may undermine regional peace and security and, therefore, cannot wait until 
consensus arises. 
Positive consensus may have worked in the past and in other areas of ASEAN 
cooperation, but may now have turned into an impediment to directing and monitoring 
dispute settlement mechanisms, especially at a time when ASEAN member states are 
convinced that “having credible dispute settlement mechanisms would help ASEAN 
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prevent festering conflicts and confrontation among the Member States, preserving the 
cooperative atmosphere for concerted efforts towards building a peaceful and prosperous 
ASEAN Community.”134 In other words, the decision-making process based on 
consensus should not be rigidly adhered to; instead, there should be more cases where 
Article 20(2) is deemed applicable. Article 20(2) of the ASEAN Charter provides that 
“[w]here consensus cannot be achieved, the ASEAN Summit may decide how a specific 
decision can be made.”135Article 20(3) of the ASEAN Charter further states that 
“[n]othing in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall affect the modes of decision-making 
as contained in the relevant ASEAN legal instruments.” This implies that ASEAN may 
review and amend its consensus rule in the DSMP as it has done with the eDSMP.
136
 The 
negative consensus rule of the eDSMP means that the ACC will automatically decide to 
“direct” the parties to resolve their disputes by good offices, mediation, conciliation or 
arbitration, unless there is a consensus not to do so. 
Last but not least, the ASEAN Charter has enhanced the role of the Secretary-
General in monitoring compliance with “the findings, recommendations or decisions 
resulting from an ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism.”137 At issue is how to 
implement these provisions of the ASEAN Charter in a meaningful way. There should be 
more specific guidelines for the Secretary-General and the ASEAN Secretariat to fulfill 
their assigned responsibilities. ASEAN Member States should establish a strong reporting 
mechanism or procedure whereby the ASEAN Secretary-General would receive 
information not only on compliance by a party to the dispute but also on non-compliance 
by the other party. The procedure should also empower the Secretary-General to initiate 
action to ensure compliance or at least request a party to the dispute to provide 
clarifications and answer inquiries about its self-report on compliance. The role of legal 
service and lawyers within the ASEAN Secretariat should be strengthened as well since 
the Secretariat has to assist the Secretary-General not only in monitoring compliance, but 
also in mediating disputes, if the Secretary-General is so requested, and in providing 
neutral and good service to good offices, conciliation and arbitration, including 
appointing arbitrators in case the parties fail to do so. As provided in the DSMP, the 
ASEAN Secretariat’s duty is not merely technical or administrative, it also has the 
responsibility to assist the arbitral tribunals and persons providing good offices, 
mediation and conciliation in dealing with the substantive legal, historical and procedural 
aspects of the dispute.
138
 To fulfill these greater expectations, the ASEAN Secretariat 
should have sufficient resources allocated to strengthen its capacity. A strong Secretariat 
is needed if ASEAN wants to effectively implement the DSMP, achieve closer 
integration and advance further in a rules-based direction. 
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